Understanding the forces that lead to correlations between pollution exposure, poverty, and race is crucial to the formation of sound environmental justice (EJ) policy. In particular, what are the roles of disproportionate siting of pollution sources versus post-siting housing market dynamics (e.g., "white flight")? Empirical analysis of post-siting dynamics has yielded mixed evidence. We demonstrate that this is because the models traditionally used to analyze it are not capable of identifying individual responses to pollution exposure. We address this limitation in two ways. First, we show how additional structure can be used along with traditional EJ data to recover behavioral parameters describing market dynamics. Second, we show how market dynamics can be directly observed using a new and distinctive data set that describes the decisions of individual homebuyers and details their circumstances (including pollution exposure) both before and after their moves. An application of the first approach shows that whites are more likely to flee TRI exposure in Los Angeles County than are other minority groupsparticularly Hispanics, who constitute a plurality and the largest group of people of color. The second approach shows that whites are both more likely to flee and less likely to come to the nuisance, compared with all other groups (particularly Hispanics). Importantly, these results contrast with those of a traditional EJ analysis, which fails to provide any consistent evidence of post-siting dynamics. If the moving patterns we recover with our two models persist over time, we would expect to see higher percentages of minority residents (particularly Hispanics) living in closer proximity to L.A. County TRI plants, lending support to the post-siting market dynamics hypothesis. JEL Classification Codes: C33, D63, Q53, R21, R23
INTRODUCTION
Two decades after its historic study, the United Church of Christ (2007) reported that over five million people of color live within one mile of a hazardous waste facility.
Understanding the social forces behind this outcome influences how we interpret such studies, assess policies designed to change existing associations between race and hazardous waste, and determine how cleanup activities will benefit different groups of people (Banzhaf 2011) . For nearly two decades, researchers have sought to better understand two competing explanations for this observed correlation between race, income, and pollution. In particular, is it the result of disproportionate (possibly discriminatory) siting of landfills, hazardous waste facilities, sources of toxic emissions, and other "locally undesirable land uses" (LULU's)? Or, is it the result of housing market dynamics that follow siting? If it is the latter, then even equitable site placement will be undone when those (typically white) residents with the means to move away from a LULU do so, and their homes are re-populated by lower income (typically minority) residents (Been 1994) . In this paper, we demonstrate that previous models used to recover evidence of post-siting market dynamics have been unidentified, and we provide two alternative empirical approaches to recovering such evidence. With those alternative approaches, we find strong evidence of market dynamics as an explanation for observed correlations between race, income, and pollution exposure.
Learning about the tradeoffs made by individual homebuyers is particularly important for understanding the motivations that drive the market dynamics story. Each year, more than 30 million people move from one home to another (US Bureau of the Census 2011a). The most common reason given for changing homes is the need for more living space or a better neighborhood; this is especially true for moves made within a county (US Census Bureau 2011b). Although additional living space and better neighborhoods can be purchased by reallocating expenditures toward housing structure and neighborhood quality and reducing consumption of other goods, homebuyers do have alternatives. For example, a homebuyer might choose a home that is located near a hazardous waste site or other LULU -this behavior has typically been referred to as "coming to a nuisance" (Been 1994) or "minority move-in" (Morello-Frosch et al. 2002) , depending upon the race of the homebuyer. A model of utility maximizing households trading-off housing stock, neighborhood quality, and other (dis)amenities is at the heart of most residential sorting models (see Kuminoff, Smith and Timmins (2010) for an overview) and could explain "coming to the nuisance" as a rational response to opportunities in the housing marketplace. However, properly measuring the tradeoffs made by different groups of homebuyers requires knowing their circumstances both before and after their moves.
Without "before and after" data, finding evidence of the market dynamics hypothesis (both "fleeing the nuisance" by some groups and "coming to the nuisance" by others) has proven elusive. In this paper, we argue that it is, in fact, not possible to identify these market dynamics using geographically aggregated (e.g. census tract) data on population flows in an unstructured model like that typically found in the EJ literature.
We address this problem in two ways. Our first approach combines modeling structure with typically available aggregate data to achieve identification, providing a method that could be easily adapted by other researchers working with similar data. That approach yields evidence suggesting that white (and, to a lesser extent, black and Asian) "flight" characterizes post-siting market dynamics, leading to long-run exposure inequities (particularly for Hispanics).
Our second approach uses individual household choices. In particular, we use proprietary information to construct a new and distinctive data set that allows us to look directly at the preand post-move circumstances of individual homebuyers. From these decisions, we are able to learn whether different groups are more or less likely to come to or flee from a nuisance (in our case, toxic emissions). We can also begin assessing the tradeoffs between housing services, neighborhood quality, and pollution exposure that arise from those moves. Despite the dramatic differences in data and method, the results of this analysis confirm those found in the structural model. This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the EJ literature that has sought to distinguish the competing roles of market dynamics and inequitable siting, and explains why the approach typically used to recover the role of post-siting market dynamics is not actually able to do so. Section 3 describes the "nuisance" we will use in our empirical application -exposure to plants listed in the EPA's Toxic Release Inventory in L.A. County. Section 4 describes the two data sets that we use. The first is a census tract-level data set similar to what has been typically used in the EJ literature. The second is a unique "buyer panel", which allows us to follow individual homebuyers as they move from one location to another. Section 5 uses the tract-level data to estimate both a traditional EJ model of market dynamics and our structural model. Section 6 uses the buyer panel data to directly test the market dynamics hypothesis. Section 7 concludes.
UNRAVELING THE CAUSES OF RACE-INCOME-POLLUTION CORRELATION

Previous Research
A number of early longitudinal studies found little or no evidence that aggregate demographic changes occurred after the siting of hazardous waste storage and disposal facilities (Oakes, Anderton, and Anderson 1996; Been and Gupta 1997; Shaikh and Loomis 1999; Pastor, Sadd, and Hipp 2001; Morello-Frosch et al. 2002) . The study by Pastor, Sadd, and Hipp (2001) , like our analysis, focuses on L.A. County. Like most other studies, it adopts a geographically aggregated (census tract) approach and uses multivariable regression and simultaneous equation methods to conclude that disproportionate facility siting provides a better explanation for the correlation between race and proximity to toxic storage and disposal facilities. Pastor, Sadd, and Hipp also express reservations about housing market-driven mobility explanations because the reasoning can imply that people of color have different preferences for risk than whites. On the other hand, they do concede that alternative explanations such as housing market discrimination could help to explain the correlation between race and pollution. Similarly, Banzhaf and Walsh (2008) use a model based on Epple, Filimon, and Romer (1984) to predict that communities experiencing reductions in TRI emissions will see increases in total population. Additionally, they predict that increases in air pollution levels will encourage higher income households to exit a community, whereas lower income households will be more likely to enter. However, Banzhaf and McCormick (2007) demonstrate that similar predictions cannot be made about neighborhood-level race variables when homebuyers have heterogeneous preferences. Banzhaf and Walsh (2010) demonstrate that predictions become even more complicated when homebuyers have preferences for the race of their neighbors.
Non-Identification in the Traditional Model of Housing Market Dynamics
In the absence of clear theoretical predictions about the response of race to pollution, diagnosing market dynamics becomes an empirical question. This is, however, an empirical question that aggregate data alone are not able to answer. In particular, changes in census tract demographics cannot be taken as evidence for or against the hypotheses of "white flight" or that people of color "come to the nuisance" to meet housing needs.
We illustrate this with a simple example. Consider a city with just three locations (j = 1, 2, 3) observed in each of two time periods (t = A, B). We use pop j t to measure the population in location j in period t. 2 s j,k is used to denote the share of individuals in location k in period A who choose to reside in location j in period B. The market dynamics associated with this collection of locations are described by the following system of equations:
A traditional EJ analysis considers the change in the population of a particular sub-group in each location j (i.e., !pop j = pop j B " pop j A ) and compares it to either the initial exposure to the 2 In most EJ analyses, !"! ! ! will refer to the population of a particular race or income sub-group (e.g., low-income minorities). Without loss of generality, we refer to a single population group in this example.
environmental amenity ! j A or to the change in exposure to the amenity in that location
> 0 is taken as evidence that members of the sub-group in question "flee the nuisance" (i.e., come to the amenity).
The first point to make is that one should not draw that conclusion from this observation.
Rather, the individual behavior of "coming to" or "fleeing from" the nuisance is described by the elements of the matrix [s j,k ] -specifically, by the way in which s j,k co-varies with the change in exposure associated with the move from k to j (!" j,k ) . This will directly measure how the change in exposure associated with a move affects the tendency of individuals to make that move. If increasing pollution exposure makes a move more likely for members of a particular subgroup, this suggests that this sub-group "comes to the nuisance".
Mathematically, we show that the change in population vectors over time does not
equations (1) and (2) 
Both examples are characterized by the same aggregate population dynamics, which a traditional EJ analysis would construe as fleeing the nuisance (i.e., population falls in the low-amenity community and rises in the high-amenity community). However, the individual market dynamics underlying Example #1 reflect "coming to the nuisance" (i.e., an improvement in the amenity makes a particular move less likely), while those underlying Example #2 reflect "fleeing the nuisance" (i.e., an improvement in the amenity makes the move more likely).
In our final example, we illustrate a case that is particularly relevant for the EJ literature.
Example #3 describes a situation in which the aggregate population distribution does not change at all between periods 1 and 2; however, the correlation between s j,k and !" j,k reveals market dynamics consistent with "coming to the nuisance". 
Slope coefficient = -0.0833 (Coming to the Nuisance)
A typical result in EJ papers seeking evidence of market dynamics is to find that population distributions do not exhibit a statistically significant response to the placement of environmental
nuisances. This final example shows that this outcome is consistent with important underlying market dynamics at the level of the individual.
These examples make clear that aggregate population dynamics alone are not able to distinguish the change in circumstances individuals face when moving. We show below that this is a problem that can be addressed with either (1) additional modeling structure applied to aggregate data, or (2) microdata describing individual homebuyer circumstances both before and after a move.
Individual Homebuyers
We will demonstrate that one solution to the problem of recovering estimates of market dynamics uses microdata describing the moving decisions of particular homebuyers. Crowder and Downey (2010) Second, what do people give up when purchasing a new house? Do minority households take on more exposure to pollution in order to acquire more housing services or higher quality neighborhood attributes? Do they do so in order to reduce overall housing expenditures so as to be able to increase other forms of consumption or savings? While this is a separate question from that of whether moves are responsible for increased exposure, it is a relevant concern if we seek policies to address that mechanism. Directly answering this question will require observing the individual's full slate of circumstances before and after moving. We identified the locations of regulated facilities by using information that the EPA makes available through the TRI Data Files and Tools webpage. 6 Using ESRI's ARCGIS mapping and spatial analysis software, we were able to identify the number of TRI facilities located within one mile of each Census tract using the tract centroid as the point of reference.
Similarly, we used the geographic coordinates for the individual houses to identify the number of TRI facilities located within one mile of each home.
Between 1990 and 1997, there were two substantial changes in TRI reporting requirements that influenced the population of facilities included in EPA data files. In 1993, the EPA added over 286 chemicals to the TRI reporting program. In 1997, the EPA added seven industrial sectors to TRI: metal mining, coal mining, electrical utilities that combust coal and/or oil, hazardous waste treatment and disposal facilities, chemical wholesale distributors, petroleum bulk stations and terminals, and solvent recovery services. As a result of these changes, we restrict our sample to the years 1998 to 2008, when TRI facility entry/exit was less likely to have been driven by changes in reporting requirements. During this period, EPA deleted phosphoric acid (2000) and reduced reporting thresholds for lead and lead compounds (2001) . To minimize the possibility that year-to-year facility entry/exit was driven by these two reporting requirement changes, we eliminated a small number of TRI facilities that only produced phosphoric acid or lead and lead compounds.
One of the most common and easiest ways to examine race and income disparities in proximity to pollution is to look for visual correlation patterns by mapping the locations of TRI 6 http://www.epa.gov/tri/tridata/index.html.
sites and comparing them with neighborhood demographics. other studies that suggest low-income people of color often live close to hazardous sites. Table 1 describes the correlation between 2005-2009 census tract racial percentages and number of TRI facilities within 1 mile of the tract centroid at that time. This correlation is particularly severe for
Hispanics. The next step is to determine what forces lead to these patterns -in particular, is there evidence that they were the result of post-siting market dynamics?
HOUSING AND HOMEBUYER DATA
We use two types of socioeconomic data in this paper: aggregate demographic and economic data measured at the census tract and individual homebuyer repeat-purchase microdata constructed from residential transactions data.
Census Tract Data
We use data provided by the U.S. Census Bureau describing tract-level demographic and 
Individual Homebuyer Data
We also use proprietary data on residential real estate transactions and mortgage information from the L.A. County area. In particular, the commercial firm DataQuick Our panel data keeps the housing transactions where we see the same buyer make two purchases within Los Angels County. Even after using the restrictions, the resulting group includes over 25,000 homebuyers. For the purpose of comparison, the only other individuallevel study (Crowder and Downey 2010) use only 13,000 households, and these are spread across the entire United States. 7
To assess whether the sample restrictions raise selection issues with respect to race, we compare the Los Angeles County buyer-based panel sample statistics with individuals in 2006-2010 Census statistics who had moved since 1998 (Table 4) . We find that the repeat purchase sample is similar to the Los Angeles Census statistics, with slight oversampling of whites at the expense of Hispanics. Table 5 provides more detailed statistics summarizing the observable attributes of the current home and the previous home each individual owned.
As shown in Figure 3 , only 5% of the white homebuyers started and stayed within one mile of the TRI site. An additional 11% of the white homebuyers came to the nuisance; that is, they decided to move from outside to inside one mile. In contrast, people of color were more likely than whites to both start and stay near and come to the nuisance. Asian homebuyer patterns were 10% (start and stay) and 18% (come to the nuisance), black homebuyers patterns were 17% (start and stay) and 16% (come to the nuisance), and Hispanic home buying patterns were 16% (start and stay) and 19% (come to the nuisance). These figures suggest that the market dynamics hypothesis may be able to explain at least part of the observed correlation between race and pollution, but they do not say anything about the role of other factors that might be correlated with pollution exposure. For this reason, the EJ literature has focused on multivariate regression to look for evidence of market dynamics.
Property Crime
The property crime rate that we employ comes from the RAND California database and is defined as the number of incidents per 100,000 residents in a "city" located within the Los Angeles metropolitan area. The data describe property and violent crime rates for 175 cities in the Los Angeles metropolitan area between 1986 and 2008. Property crime is defined as "crimes against property, including burglary and motor vehicle theft." Currently, we calculate crime rates for a census tract using the average of the 3 cities nearest the census tract centroid. We calculate crime rates each house in our data set using the nearest nearest city.
School Quality
The school quality data (elementary school and high school) comes the California Department of Education. To measure school quality, we use the Academic Performance Index, a single number, that ranges from a low of 200 to a high of 1000. Currently, we calculate a school quality measure for a census tract using the average of the 3 schools (elementary and high school) nearest the census tract centroid. We also calculate school quality for each house using the nearest school.
TRACT-LEVEL EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Traditional Census Tract Analysis
We begin with a traditional EJ market dynamics model, which examines the statistical relationship between changes in aggregate tract-level demographics and a variety of tract attributes (including TRI exposure). We therefore report the results of the following specification in Table 6 .
where X = TRI 2000, j (left panel) or !TRI j (right panel), and !%R j measures the change in the percentage of race group R in tract j. 8 Consistent with much of the literature, we fail to find any evidence of significant correlations between racial dynamics and pollution exposure.
A Structural Model of Neighborhood Dynamics
The model in this section builds upon the framework used in Section 2 to illustrate why a simple analysis of demographic changes at the tract level is unable to identify post-siting market dynamics. In particular, by imposing some structure on s j,k (the share of individuals of a particular group in tract k who choose to move to tract j), we are able to identify the role of TRI exposure in driving those moves. Equations (1) and (2) represented a system of six equations with nine unknown s j,k 's , leading to an identification problem. By instead parameterizing s j,k as a function of location attributes, this identification problem can be overcome.
Building upon the simple example described in Section 2, we begin with the predicted population in neighborhood j in period B:
We specify the mean utility from living in location k ( ! k ) as a function of observable attributes of that location ( X k ), attributes that are unobserved by the econometrician ( ! k ), and a vector of parameters ( ! ):
We return to the relationship between ! k , X k , and ! k below. For now, we simply specify that the utility an individual i receives from living in location k is given by:
where ! i,k refers to the idiosyncratic utility that individual i receives from living in location k.
The change in utility an individual i currently living in location k receives from moving to location j is therefore given by:
where DIST j,k is the distance in kilometers between the centroids of tract j and k. µ measures the disutility of moving. The change in utility from staying in one's current location is zero.
If ! i,k is distributed i.i.d. Type I extreme value, then the share of individuals in location k who find it optimal to move to location j is given by the familiar logit functional form:
Similarly, the share of individuals in location k who would find it optimal to remain in that location is given by:
Open Migration Systems
The model of migration becomes even more complicated when we recognize that many of the observed changes in the distribution of population may actually reflect broader migration patterns into and out of the "system" being considered. The problem of the "open system" is commonplace amongst papers looking for evidence of post-siting market dynamics. It arises whenever the researcher considers a subset of locations, allowing movements into and out of that subset. Been (1994) , for example, considers only those census tracts surrounding the nuisances used by GAO (1983) and Bullard (1983) . Oakes, Anderton, and Anderson (1996) use only tracts containing TSDF's and a small subset of control tracts. Been and Gupta (1997) In the estimation below, we consider movements within L.A. County census tracts (k = 1, 2, …, N) and a single "catch-all" location (k = N+1) that captures all other locations. This simplification and, in particular, the number of individuals assumed to be in the catch-all location, is innocuous when it comes to identification and estimation.
Timeperiods
We use data from the 2000 decennial census to define period A, and data from the 2005-
2009 5-year American Community Survey sample to define period B. Both data sets take 5% samples of the total population. For the sake of simplicity, we will refer to the two periods as 2000 and 2007.
Estimation
Estimation is carried out in two stages and is based on the procedure described in 
Practically, solving for {! k } k=1 N +1 and ! is made simple by noting that, if we divide both sides of equation (4) ! , we get:
where
. 10 Conveniently, given a guess at µ , equation (11) update the ! guess according to the following rule, which parallels that used in Berry (1994) :
10 Note that, by introducing the "catch-all" location k = N+1, we can effectively make this into a closed system, where anyone entering L.A. County comes from location N+1 and anyone leaving it moves to location N + 1. Of course, the size of the mean utility we impute to the catch-all location will be determined by the number of people we assume to be there. This does not present a problem as long as we do not attempt to interpret the mean utility of location N+1. What is important is that the values of the mean utilities associated with the other locations (k = 1, 2,…, N) are not affected by the assumed population of N+1. We find this to indeed be the case, with our results being essentially identical regardless of whether we define the population of N+1 to be 2, 4, or 6 times the net change in population in (k = 1, 2,…, N) between 2000 and 2007. 11 In general, there is no scale associated with the vector of utility indices (i.e., one could add an arbitrary constant value to all of them and not impact the behavioral shares). As such, a normalization is required. We normalize the values such that they are mean zero. %Stay R for the appropriate racial group. We use a bisection method to search over values of µ that equate predicted %Stay R to actual %Stay R , solving for the values of {! k } k=1 N +1 at each step.
Complication: Zero Shares
The methodology described above assumes a positive population share ( ! j ) in each location in each period. In our EJ application, we apply this procedure to different racial groups.
Using a high-resolution definition of geography (e.g., census tracts), it is possible to observe tracts containing no members of a particular group. This is, in fact, the case in L.A. County, where 3.4% of tracts contain no whites, 14.9% contain no blacks, 10.2% contain no Asians, and 0.2% contain no Hispanics. This creates a practical difficulty, as equation (12) is not defined for a particular value of j if ! j
We deal with this problem by following a strategy similar to that used by Timmins and Murdock (2007) . They show that, by adding a "patch" -i.e., a small positive artificial population ! (e.g., ! = 10 "3 ! to each location, all locations will have positive shares and the procedure described above will be computationally feasible. Moreover, the value of ! j associated with zero-share locations will become increasingly negative as the value of ! becomes smaller and smaller ( ! j " #$ as ! " 0 ). This would create a problem using a leastsquares regression technique to decompose {! k } k=1 N . 12 Consider a linear specification of equation (5):
In particular, estimates of ! will vary with the choice of ! . 12 Note that we do not have ! ! data for the "catch-all" location N+1, and the value of ! ! , k = N+1 depends upon the assumed population of that location. We therefore drop location N+1 from the second stage of the estimation procedure.
however, with fewer than half of the ! j 's falling in this lower part of the distribution, median regression results are essentially invariant to the choice of ! . Table A1 in 
Applying Structural Model to Stylized Examples
In this sub-section, we apply the structural model described above to the three examples used in Section 2 to illustrate that the traditional EJ model does not identify housing market dynamics. It is a simple matter to show that the structural model is able to identify those dynamics. Figures 5 (a) - (c) illustrates the mean utilities ( ! j ) recovered from a contraction mapping applied to the three locations versus the level of the nuisance in each. A simple linear fit applied to those points shows that the structural model is indeed able to recover "coming to the nuisance" behavior in Examples #1 and #3, and "fleeing the nuisance" behavior in Example #2.
Structural Model Results
The first stage of our structural estimation procedure recovers values for ! that make predicted "stay" percentages exactly equal to observed "stay" percentages for each race group.
These estimates are: µ Asian = 1.16216, µ Black = 1.36284, µ Hisp = 1.30202, and µ White = 1.20122 .
Results of the quantile second-stage regressions are described in Table 7 . 13 Using either TRI 2000 or AVG TRI !to measure the nuisance, whites, Asians and blacks all exhibit statistically significant "fleeing" behavior, although the fleeing effect for whites is significantly larger than that of the other two minority groups. Hispanics actually exhibit a statistically significant "coming to the nuisance" behavior. Together, these estimates explain the correlations described in Table 1 ; if these behaviors were allowed to play-out over time, we would expect to see a large negative correlation with TRI exposure for whites, a large positive correlation for Hispanics, and black and Asian correlation falling somewhere in between.
Mean TRI exposure in 2000 is equal to 0.944 (! 1). At that mean, these coefficient estimates can be readily interpreted as the elasticity of the share of each race group who choose to remain in a particular neighborhood with respect to a change in that neighborhood's TRI
. A 1% increase in TRI exposure therefore reduces the share of whites, Asians, and blacks choosing to remain in a tract by 0.26%, 0.11%, and 0.15%, respectively. It increases the share of Hispanics choosing to remain there by 0.03%.
13 Table A2 in the appendix reports results using the natural log of moving distance in the first stage.
INDIVIDUAL HOMEBUYER ANALYSIS
Next, we look at the residential moves made by individual members of each racial group and the tradeoffs in other house and neighborhood attributes that accompany those moves. There are three key differences between individual data and the aggregate data used in the previous section. First, with individual data, we are able to control for "starting" and "ending"
circumstances that accompany a move. Specifically, we use information on the starting and ending proximity to a TRI facility, housing services and numerous dimensions of neighborhood quality associated with each move. A second difference is that, unlike tract-level data, with individual data we know the precise point in time when each individual moves. Whereas we used the 2000 or the 2000-2007 average TRI exposures in that analysis, we are able to use the exact change in TRI exposure that accompanies the move in the year when that move takes place for the analysis described below. Third, with individual data, we can control for both race and income as determinants of moving behavior; cross-tab data on race and income are not available at a sufficient level of geographic resolution to include income as a control in the tract-level analysis.
Moving Patterns
Our analysis of moving patterns starts by looking at the choices made by homebuyers who initially reside inside a one-mile radius drawn around one of the Los Angeles TRI sites.
During their subsequent move, we determine whether certain racial groups are more or less likely to move outside of that 1 mile radius (i.e. flee the nuisance). A binary outcome model for the probability of leaving (p) is used, where the dependent variable (y) takes one of two values:
The probit model is specified where p depends race groups and income (x) and F is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
As shown in the left column of Table 8 , white buyers (i.e., the excluded group) starting close to TRI sites are more likely to leave the nuisance relative to people of color, and the likelihood of fleeing increases with income. Individual results parallel the results of our structural model. Of the four race groups, Hispanics are the least likely to move out of the TRI buffer.
Having found evidence of differential "fleeing" across the race groups, we now look to see whether there is additional evidence in micro data that certain groups actually come to the nuisance. To address the question, we use choices for buyers who initially started outside of the one-mile radius around a TRI site. During subsequent moves, we determine whether each racial group is more or less likely to locate inside a one-mile radius (i.e. come to the nuisance). We use a similar binary outcome model approach where the dependent variable (y) takes one of two values:
The second probit model results, described in the right column of Table 8, show that there are economically significant differences in the probability of coming to the nuisance between whites and all other racial groups. Although no group is likely to come to the nuisance, all minority groups are significantly more likely than whites to move closer to TRI facilities; the difference between whites and Hispanics is most economically significant. As a result, we find direct evidence of different sorting responses that may lead to long-run racial differences in TRI exposure.
Tradeoffs
One of the most important concepts in microeconomics is the budget constraint. Because of it, getting more of something good typically means giving up something else that we like. In order to explore the tradeoffs made by members of different racial groups as they move closer to or further from TRI sites, we consider the changes in living space and some indicators of neighborhood quality that accompany those moves. Specifically, we examine the change in square footage, property crime rate, API score in elementary and high schools, and the change in overall housing expenditure. We do this separately by race and for those who (i) stay inside a one-mile buffer when moving, (ii) move out from inside a one-mile buffer, (iii) remain outside a one-mile buffer, or (iv) move in from outside a one-mile buffer. Results are reported in Table 9 .
The columns labeled "Diff" report the change in the attribute (i) for those who moved outside the buffer relative to those who stayed inside, and (ii) for those who moved inside the buffer relative to those who stayed outside. The idea is to use the change in the attribute for those who stay (either inside or outside the buffer) as a control for those who move (either outside or into the buffer).
We find that whites moving out of a TRI buffer tend to buy larger houses with less crime and better quality education than do whites moving to another house that is within a 1 mile buffer, but they also pay more. Conversely, whites moving into a buffer experience a worsening of each of these attributes relative to whites who move to another house that is outside a buffer, but they also pay less. Hispanics make a qualitatively similar set of tradeoffs, although the magnitudes of the tradeoffs associated with crime and elementary education are larger. Both of these groups appear to be sacrificing more "other consumption" (i.e., by paying more for a house) to get more housing stock and/or better neighborhood amenities, including less exposure to TRI pollution (or vice-versa).
On average, blacks exhibit a different pattern of tradeoffs. In particular, those moving out of a buffer get a slightly larger house for which they pay more, but also get lower-quality schools. In exchange for a reduction in exposure to pollution, they experience a relative increase in exposure to property crime. In summary, these individuals trade-off school quality and exposure to crime for a reduction in pollution exposure. Blacks starting outside of a buffer engage in a different tradeoff. Those individuals who move into a buffer pay more for a smaller house with more crime and lower quality schools, relative to an individual who moves to another house outside the buffer. This is difficult to explain without introducing some other factor that drives moving decisions. Exploring what these other factors could be is something that we continue to examine.
Finally, Asians moving outside the buffer generally face a smaller increase in price than those remaining inside the buffer. This is in spite of the fact that they get a bigger house and improved school quality. They do, however, also face an increase in property crime. These individuals trade off increased crime for an increase in other consumption, an improvement in school quality, and less exposure to pollution. Asians moving into the buffer, on the other hand, receive worse schools, a smaller house, and higher crime rates relative to those who remain outside the buffer. However, they pay significantly less for their house. In this sense, their tradeoffs are similar to Hispanics and whites.
CONCLUSIONS
This study uses two alternative modeling strategies to take a fresh look at an important environmental justice question -what forces lead to the observed correlations between pollution exposure and race and what tradeoffs do different racial groups make between pollution exposure, housing size, and neighborhood quality? Our first approach uses data common in the EJ literature -tract-level aggregate information observed at several points in time. We demonstrate that the typical approach to analyzing these data is not able to identify market dynamics in response to exposure to a nuisance (i.e., "fleeing from" or "coming to"). We do show, however, that with additional modeling structure, these behaviors can be recovered from aggregate data. In an application to TRI exposure in L.A. County, we find evidence of strong "fleeing" behavior on the part of whites (and, to a lesser extent, Asians and blacks) -behavior that, over the long-run, can explain the disproportionate exposure of minority groups (particularly Hispanics) to toxics found in simple correlations. These patterns are not evident based on a simple analysis of the sort typically conducted in the EJ literature.
With access to a unique data source that allows us to track individual home-buyers as they move from one house to another in L.A. County, we are able to demonstrate explicitly that these are indeed the underlying market dynamics with respect to TRI exposure. With these individual-level micro data, we separate out the effects of "coming to" and "fleeing" the nuisance and find evidence of both. Repeated housing choices made by different racial groups provide direct evidence that people of color (particularly Hispanics and poorer residents of all races) are less likely to flee the nuisance while whites are significantly less likely than all three minority groups to come to the nuisance. This simple analysis confirms the results of our structural tract-level analysis, particularly with respect to whites and Hispanics.
Looking specifically at the tradeoffs that underlie the movements described by our individual micro data, we find that people of all race groups in L.A. County exchange proximity to TRI plants for some combination of school quality, exposure to property crime, house size, and other consumption. This result suggests that the previous reservations expressed about residential sorting stories may be misplaced, especially if stakeholders only interpret them to imply that people of color do not care about environmental quality. Rather, moves involve tradeoffs and minorities may be willing to sacrifice poor environmental quality for improvements in other neighborhood features like school quality, which improve their welfare. Early social advocates, such as Robert Bullard (2000) , may have therefore framed residential sorting in an alternative and useful way by conceding that people vote with their feet, but emphasizing differences in opportunities when they exercise their "vote." Our study accepts Bullard's premise and recent suggestions in Banzhaf (2011) that questions related to fairness and injustice may be better addressed by understanding the reasons why different racial groups have different opportunities (e.g. forces determining the underlying distribution of economic resources).
In conclusion, residential sorting behavior presents some unique challenges for environmental justice policy because sorting behavior can undercut well-intentioned policies designed to improve the distribution of environmental quality (Banzhaf 2011) . It may also mean that the set of policy levers available are different from those traditionally considered by environmental justice policy makers. For example, if coming to the nuisance is in part driven by deteriorating neighborhood amenities (increases in crime, low performing schools) in environmentally friendly neighborhoods, then policies that improve the quality of public goods in these neighborhoods could indirectly reduce exposure disparities. Policy makers and stakeholders might consider how other policies targeted at non-environmentally related neighborhood quality improvements can improve the distribution of environmental quality across different racial group. Indicates significance at 10% ( * ), 5% ( ** ), and 1% ( *** ). Standard errors in parentheses.
